>CFTC & SEC Release Report on Flash Crash of May 6th

>The SEC and CFTC issued their report on the flash crash of May 6th today arguing that a single large investor, previously identified as Waddell & Reed Financial, entered a computerized selling order that caused a cascade of selling across the market. The report provides a good synopsis of what happened. Below are the notable excerpts from the report:

Summary

On May 6, 2010, the prices of many U.S.-based equity products experienced an extraordinarily rapid decline and recovery. That afternoon, major equity indices in both the futures and securities markets, each already down over 4% from their prior-day close, suddenly plummeted a further 5-6% in a matter of minutes before rebounding almost as quickly…

…Over 20,000 trades across more than 300 securities were executed at prices more than 60% away from their values just moments before. Moreover, many of these trades were executed at prices of a penny or less, or as high as $100,000, before prices of those securities returned to their “pre-crash” levels.

What happened in e-minis?

At 2:32 p.m., against this backdrop of unusually high volatility and thinning liquidity, a large fundamental trader (a mutual fund complex) initiated a sell program to sell a total of 75,000 E-Mini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion) as a hedge to an existing equity position…

…This large fundamental trader chose to execute this sell program via an automated execution algorithm (“Sell Algorithm”) that was programmed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-Mini market to target an execution rate set to 9% of the trading volume calculated over the previous minute, but without regard to price or time…

…However, on May 6, when markets were already under stress, the Sell Algorithm chosen by the large trader to only target trading volume, and neither price nor time, executed the sell program extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes…

…Between 2:32 p.m. and 2:45 p.m., as prices of the E-Mini rapidly declined, the Sell Algorithm sold about 35,000 E-Mini contracts (valued at approximately $1.9 billion) of the 75,000 intended. During the same time, all fundamental sellers combined sold more than 80,000 contracts net, while all fundamental buyers bought only about 50,000 contracts net, for a net fundamental imbalance of 30,000 contracts. This level of net selling by fundamental sellers is about 15 times larger compared to the same 13-minute interval during the previous three days, while this level of net buying by the fundamental buyers is about 10 times larger compared to the same time period during the previous three days.

What happened in equities?

Based on their respective individual risk assessments, some market makers and other liquidity providers widened their quote spreads, others reduced offered liquidity, and a significant number withdrew completely from the markets. Some fell back to manual trading but had to limit their focus to only a subset of securities as they were not able to keep up with the nearly ten-fold increase in volume that occurred as prices in many securities rapidly declined…

…HFTs in the equity markets, who normally both provide and take liquidity as part of their strategies, traded proportionally more as volume increased, and overall were net sellers in the rapidly declining broad market along with most other participants. Some of these firms continued to trade as the broad indices began to recover and individual securities started to experience severe price dislocations, whereas others reduced or halted trading completely…

…Between 2:40 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., approximately 2 billion shares traded with a total volume exceeding $56 billion. Over 98% of all shares were executed at prices within 10% of their 2:40 p.m. value. However, as liquidity completely evaporated in a number of individual securities and ETFs,11 participants instructed to sell (or buy) at the market found no immediately available buy interest (or sell interest) resulting in trades being executed at irrational prices as low as one penny or as high as $100,000. These trades occurred as a result of so-called stub quotes, which are quotes generated by market makers (or the exchanges on their behalf) at levels far away from the current market in order to fulfill continuous two-sided quoting obligations even when a market maker has withdrawn from active trading.

Lessons Learned

One key lesson is that under stressed market conditions, the automated execution of a large sell order can trigger extreme price movements, especially if the automated execution algorithm does not take prices into account. Moreover, the interaction between automated execution programs and algorithmic trading strategies can quickly erode liquidity and result in disorderly markets…

…May 6 was also an important reminder of the inter-connectedness of our derivatives and securities markets, particularly with respect to index products…

…Another key lesson from May 6 is that many market participants employ their own versions of a trading pause – either generally or in particular products – based on different combinations of market signals. While the withdrawal of a single participant may not significantly impact the entire market, a liquidity crisis can develop if many market participants withdraw at the same time. This, in turn, can lead to the breakdown of a fair and orderly price-discovery process, and in the extreme case trades can be executed at stub-quotes used by market makers to fulfill their continuous two-sided quoting obligations…

…A further observation from May 6 is that market participants’ uncertainty about when trades will be broken can affect their trading strategies and willingness to provide liquidity. In fact, in our interviews many participants expressed concern that, on May 6, the exchanges and FINRA only broke trades that were more than 60% away from the applicable reference price, and did so using a process that was not transparent…

…Whether trading decisions are based on human judgment or a computer algorithm, and whether trades occur once a minute or thousands of times each second, fair and orderly markets require that the standard for robust, accessible, and timely market data be set quite high. Although we do not believe significant market data delays were the primary factor in causing the events of May 6, our analyses of that day reveal the extent to which the actions of market participants can be influenced by uncertainty about, or delays in, market data.

Accordingly, another area of focus going forward should be on the integrity and reliability of market centers’ data processes, especially those that involve the publication of trades and quotes to the consolidated market data feeds. In addition, we will be working with the market centers in exploring their members’ trading practices to identify any unintentional or potentially abusive or manipulative conduct that may cause system delays that inhibit the ability of market participants to engage in a fair and orderly process of price discovery.

Download the full report here.

>Where is HFT Headed? World Research Group Summit

>By: Brandon Rowley

I spent the afternoon off the trading floor attending the Buy Side Tech: High Frequency Trading Summit put on by the World Research Group. Our CEO and Managing Partner of T3 Capital Management, Sean Hendelman, was featured on two panels discussing a variety of aspects of high frequency trading development and the future of HFT.

I arrived late after trading the morning with the panel discussion on “Assessing the Growth of High Frequency Trading in Futures, Options, and FX” in progress but heard a few interesting tidbits worth repeating. One panelist noted how HFT strategies based on speed now have so many competitors in US equity markets and options that major profit potential is becoming increasingly limited in terms of the latency game. The future of the industry lies primarily in trading across asset classes and across global markets. Global currencies offer significant arbitrage opportunities as the landscape is still quite fragmented with many different exchanges across the world. For example, there are only 4 fiber-optic lines running from London to New York and being on the right line with the highest speed is crucial and speed arb is still possible in that space.

Another highlight was the idea of the high frequency trading style becoming a strategy into which investors would want to put their money within a portfolio. Like the desire for exposure to various asset classes within a portfolio, it is feasible to think that in the future there could be a demand for an exchange-traded fund that invests in HFT strategies. There is certainly a natural attraction for portfolio managers to a non-economic, no-risk strategy.

The last interesting comment I heard was out of Mark S. Longo from theoptionsinsider.com who noted the distortive impact of non-economic volume particularly in the options market. While many market participants use “unusual” trading activity in options as an indicator of possible future movement, many arbitrage strategies in the HFT universe may be creating false signals. Dividend arb or fee arb are two examples that can cause a surge in volume that is entirely non-directional in strategy. He finished by mentioning that investors would be wise to look more toward open interest and other readings along with unusual trading volumes.

The next panel discussion was entitled “Build or Buy? Strategies for Determining the First Step in Implementation” and Sean was one of four participants with another very intriguing guest being Adam Afshar, President of Hyde Park Global Investments. Hyde Park creates robotic artificial intelligence programs designed to self-adjust their trading to optimize results, a fascinating concept to begin with.

The primary thrust of this discussion came from Sean and Afshar telling interested observers to focus on the strategy before considering the build or buy decision. Broad consensus between panelists seemed to be that buying was the best option when starting out because of the time to market and lack of expertise but this will likely grow into a hybrid operation over time as you demand higher control over your data and execution. By Afshar’s estimates it would take a firm $5-10 million to fully setup low-latency execution in-house involving direct feeds, co-location, etc. Yet, Sean stressed how important it is to have a strategy that works first because despite seemingly common opinion that HFT shops simply setup and make money, it is actually extraordinarily difficult to find profitable strategies as the vast majority of strategies fail and the ones that do work can go out-of-favor very rapidly.

Next up was a half an hour presentation by Matt Samelson of Woodbine Associates titled “The Impact of High Frequency Strategies on Spreads and Volatility on Highly Liquid U.S. Equities”. The presentation was a summary of the $3,750 “ground-breaking study” available from the firm with their basic argument being that spreads tightened in 2/3 of the 39 most liquid stocks throughout 2008-09 and therefore the “traditional” market participant is better off, not worse off, as HFT has grown as a share of trading volume. While this presentation purported to defend HFT against attacks, it accomplished nothing in terms of engaging in the contemporary debate. While T3 Capital runs HFT strategies and welcomes defense against much of the misinformation out there, this presentation was sorely lacking only working to regurgitate old arguments. It’s as if he were a philosophy professor that taught Descartes’ Meditations and simply didn’t bother to acknowledge the circularity objection to the “I think, therefore I am” statement (even though I don’t believe this is a crippling refutation but that’s another discussion). The current debate has moved far beyond his presentation.

The anti-HFT crowd believes traditional market participants are being disadvantaged in illiquid securities, not liquid ones. And, I won’t be one to join the stereotyping, most of the “anti-HFT” crowd are not anti-HFT per se. They are against strategies that they believe hurt the retail trader/investor and there’s clearly merit to many of their thoughts on the problems with the current market structure. The primary issue within the liquid security universe is not the spread but the overall true trading cost as the ECN fee structure encourages an absurd level of liquidity provision in stocks not needing any. Samelson also explained a bizarre statistic of “realized spread” in which they measured where a stock was trading five minutes after an HFT trade and claimed that the majority of the time the stock had gone in favor of the counterparty to the trade. The use of five minutes is highly arbitrary and is completely irrelevant in the HFT world especially rebate traders who may have been in and out of the stock multiple times by the time five minutes has elapsed.

The second panel discussion with Sean was titled “The Drive for Zero Latency: Optimizing Existing Systems for High Frequency Trading Strategies” moderated by Jayaram Muthuswamy, Professor of Finance at Kent State University. Muthuswamy offered a stimulating academic perspective on the current race for low latency. While the concept of the limiting factor in latency ultimately reducing to the speed of light was mentioned, the discussion shifted towards the various areas of possible latency reduction. It is not simply the distance and speed of execution, it is also quote speeds coming in and the speed of interpretation, the complexity of the algorithm code and its decision-making speed, routing speeds, and regulatory hindrances among other things. Sean also pointed out the importance of low latency during times of market stress where inefficiencies are high and HFT can find substantial opportunity. These volatile times, like an FOMC announcement for example, act as a perfect test of the capabilities of an HFT system.

Ultimately, Muthuswamy finds HFT to be a source of incredible progress. He maintains this belief even while he mentioned an email from his friend Eugene Fama, often regarded as the father of the efficient market hypothesis, where Fama stated his beliefs on the growth in HFT in one line: “excessive HFT can be deleterious to market efficiency”. Yet, even with the incredible growth, Muthuswamy believes we are only “scratching the surface” of what is possible particularly in statistical arbitrage between any and every market and asset class around the world. He hinted that in his speech tomorrow he will attempt to hypothesize what the ultra low latency game will be dependent on ultimately: the complexity of the underlying code.

>The World of High Frequency Trading

>By: Brandon Rowley

With all of the recent interest in high frequency trading, I put together the chart below explaining what we see as the six primary strategies of buy-side short-term algorithmic traders. This chart excludes the subset of algorithmic trading dedicated to the execution of buy-side funds with longer-term interests. These six strategies are what short-term traders contend with on a daily basis and understanding their methods is useful.

http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=30295187&access_key=key-226lg4zo036orzmn202h&page=1&viewMode=slideshow